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Abstract
How do the choices of individual firms contribute to the dominance of a
currency in global trade? Using export transactions data from the UK over
2010-2016, we document strong evidence of two mechanisms that promote the
use of a dominant currency: (1) prior experience: the probability that a firm
invoices its exports to a new market in a dominant currency is increasing in
the number of years the firm has used the dominant currency in its existing
markets; (2) strategic complementarity: a firm is more likely to invoice its
exports in the currency chosen by the majority of its competitors in a foreign
destination market in order to stabilize its residual demand in that market.
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1 Introduction
The majority of international trade transactions are invoiced in a small number of
currencies, with the US dollar being the dominant currency globally. Recent research
documents a close link between the currency in which a transaction is invoiced and
the degree to which firms pass through exchange rate movements into import prices
(Gopinath, 2015). This suggests invoicing choices are fundamental to understand-
ing the global transmission of productivity and monetary shocks (Gopinath et al.
(2020)). While an increasing number of studies document and analyse the choices
of invoicing currencies by firms ( Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010), Bonadio,
Fischer and Saure (2019), Auer, Burstein, Erhardt and Lein (2019), Chen, Chung
and Novy (2019) and Corsetti, Crowley and Han (2020), Amiti, Itskhoki and Kon-
ings (2020)), the underlying mechanisms behind the dynamics of invoicing currency
choices, especially the dominance of a few currencies in global trade flows, is not yet
well understood.
Using granular export transactions from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) Overseas Trade in Goods Database over 2010-2016, we find strong evidence
of two mechanisms that promote and sustain the use of the US dollar among British
exporters. Strategic complementarity, choosing the same invoicing currency as one’s
competitors in a market, is an important driver; UK exporters are more likely to
invoice in dollars if a larger share of other British firms’ exports of the same product
to the same foreign market is invoiced in dollars. More interestingly, we identify a new
dynamic mechanism that feeds into dollar dominance; a firm’s choice to invoice its
exports to a new foreign market in dollars is increasing in its previous experience with
dollar-invoicing to other foreign markets. A firm that is strategically motivated to
invoice in dollars in order to better maintain price stability relative to its competitors
in one foreign market gains experience with dollar-invoicing which then feeds into
a higher likelihood of using the dollar in a firm’s new foreign markets. In this way,
the two mechanisms reinforce each other and appear to strengthen and sustain the
dominance of the dollar in global trade.
The UK presents an interesting case to study because its own currency, the pound
sterling, is used for invoicing about one-half of British exports to extra-EU destina-
tions, but the US dollar plays an important role as the second most popular currency
used in invoicing; around one-third of British export value sent outside the EU over
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2010-2016 was invoiced in US dollars.1 Previous work from Corsetti, Crowley and
Han (2020) has documented interesting and important patterns in the use of invoic-
ing currencies by British exporters; most notably, 99% of the UK’s extra-EU export
value originates from firms that use at least two currencies, 50% of export value orig-
inates from UK exporters that are using at least two different currencies to invoice
sales of the same product to the same foreign destination within a calendar year,
and finally, British exporters actively switch the currencies used to invoice exports
over time. Altogether, this information tells us that invoicing currency is an active
margin of choice for British exporters and examining the static and dynamic factors
that influence this choice is important.
Empirically, we document two novel facts that are essential to understanding the
dynamics of invoicing currency choices and the formation of a dominant currency.
First, we analyse and document the role that previous successful experience with
dollar-invoicing plays in future choices, focusing on a firm’s choice of an invoicing
currency when it enters a new foreign market. One year of dollar-invoicing in any
of a firm’s existing markets increases the probability of dollar invoicing in a new
market by 4 percentage points relative to those firms that have never used the dollar
in any market. Importantly, the probability of dollar invoicing in a new market
is increasing in a firm’s experience with the dollar – a firm with 6 years of dollar-
invoicing experience is 14 percentage points more likely to invoice in dollars in a new
market relative to those firms which have never invoiced in dollars. This evidence
suggests the existence of a positive feedback channel of dollar invoicing that cannot
be explained by conventional static models of invoicing currency choice.
Second, we document micro evidence on the role of complementarity in firms’
invoicing choices. We find a one standard deviation increase in the dollar-invoicing
share of a firm’s competitors from the UK raises the probability of dollar-invoicing
by 2.1 percentage points, corresponding to a 9.45% increase from the mean dollar
invoicing probability in our estimation sample. Moreover, we estimate that the
quantitative importance of strategic complementarity as a factor underpinning dollar
invoicing is more pronounced for large firms and for less differentiated products,
consistent with theoretical models of oligopolistic competition.
Consistent with existing findings in Chung (2016) and Amiti, Itskhoki and Kon-
1The currency used to invoice UK exports to the EU is not recorded by HMRC and is, there-
fore, unknown. Approximately one-half of British exports over 2010-2016 were invoiced in pounds
sterling. See Figure A1 of Corsetti, Crowley and Han (2020).
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ings (2020), we confirm a significant role of imported inputs in determining the invoic-
ing currency for exports. A higher share of imports invoiced in dollars is associated
with a higher likelihood of invoicing exports in dollars. In contrast, imports invoiced
in other currencies - the euro in particular - reduce the probability of dollar-invoicing.
This pattern is consistent with a practice in which firms hedge their exchange rate
risk in dollars by aligning their export currency with their import currency.
Theoretically, we build a general framework that incorporates the dynamics of
invoicing currency choices and characterizes the necessary conditions under which
the model can reproduce our newly documented empirical patterns. We show our
framework of invoicing dynamics can be easily integrated with a conventional static
invoicing currency choice model through the dynamics of managerial costs. For
example, if the cost of using dollars can be shared across the firm’s dollar-invoiced
destinations, the managerial cost of using dollars will be a decreasing function of a
firm’s dollar invoicing share in the past. Therefore, firms with a larger number of
dollar-invoiced foreign export markets will be more likely to invoice in dollars in any
new markets. More importantly, we show how the firm’s invoicing choices change
over time as a firm grows and how invoicing dynamics interact with entry dynamics
to jointly determine the evolution of a dominant currency.
Altogether, our analysis identifies a firm’s experience with dollars as an important
channel contributing to the dollar’s dominance. At the same time, it lends strong
empirical support to theoretical works that have emphasized strategic complementar-
ity and dollar-invoiced imported inputs as important factors associated with vehicle
currency pricing (VCP).2 The role of a firm’s past experience with dollar-invoicing
as a driver behind future choices has not been previously considered in the literature
which, due to data limitations, has focused primarily on cross-sectional variation.
Our results open up a new line of research exploring the evolution of invoicing choices
over time and across destinations. This highlights the importance of the dynamic
paths of individual firms’ choices in the formation of a dominant currency.
Related literature. This paper builds on a rich theoretical and empirical lit-
erature on endogenous currency choices and their implications [Friberg (1998), Bac-
chetta and van Wincoop (2005), Goldberg and Tille (2008, 2016), Devereux, Engel
and Storgaard (2004), Mukhin (2017), Devereux, Dong and Tomlin (2017) and Ly-
2Theoretical models emphasizing strategic complementarity in invoicing currency choices in-
clude Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005), Goldberg and Tille (2008), Mukhin (2017) and Gopinath
et al. (2019).
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onnet, Martin and Mejean (2019)]. An early contribution from Goldberg and Tille
(2008) uses cross-country data on the aggregate shares of different invoicing curren-
cies to analyse a theoretical model of a firm’s strategic incentive to choose the same
currency as other exporters.3 More recent work has used large firm-level datasets to
study the use of different invoicing currencies by firms. Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings
(2020) study Belgian firms’ trade with extra-EU destinations and document that
larger firms are more likely to invoice in dollars while smaller, less import-intensive
firms invoice in euros (i.e., producer currency pricing) and exhibit almost complete
exchange rate pass-through into foreign import prices. To further this line of re-
search, we present a unified framework for invoicing currency choice and examine
both the existing channels of strategic complementarity and operational hedging as
well as a novel dynamic channel that arises from the managerial cost of using a
foreign currency.
A growing number of studies have focused on the dynamic implications of in-
voicing currency choices. Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) analyse the dynamics of
price adjustments under dollar versus non-dollar invoicing currencies for US im-
ports. Bonadio, Fischer and Saure (2019) study the speed of pass through under
different invoicing currencies in response the large Swiss Franc depreciation in 2015.
Corsetti, Crowley and Han (2020) document the pricing dynamics around the Brexit
referendum. Our contribution is to investigate the dynamic aspect of invoicing cur-
rency choices rather than price adjustments conditional on a particular invoicing
currency. Our results unveil a new dimension of invoicing dynamics that is essential
to understanding the dynamics of price adjustments in the medium and long run and
uncovering the mystery of why trade is dominated by so few currencies.
Our work complements the literature that examines strategic complementarity
in price-setting and its relation to exchange rate pass-through. Gopinath and It-
skhoki (2011), Auer and Schoenle (2016) and Pennings (2017) use micro data on
US imports to analyse the impact of competitors’ price changes on firms’ exchange
rate pass-through into prices and find that competitors’ prices reduce the direct pass
through of exchange rates into import prices. Because of data limitations, these pa-
pers cannot simultaneously investigate invoicing currency choice, Nevertheless, they
3Their analysis emphasizes the prevalence of dollar pricing in homogeneous goods sectors as in-
direct evidence of a form of strategic complementarity that they refer to as the “coalescing motive”;
that is, because demand for homogeneous products is more price-elastic than that for heterogeneous
goods, the firms selling homogeneous goods have stronger incentives to stabilize their relative prices
vis-a-vis their competitors and, hence, are more likely to price in dollars.
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point to the important role of competition in dampening exchange rate pass through.
Using a unique micro dataset for the Belgian manufacturing sector, Amiti, Itskhoki
and Konings (2019) provide a quantitatively significant estimate of firms’ price re-
sponses to changes in competitors’ prices with substantial heterogeneity arising from
differences in market power. Our paper confirms the strategic complementarity in
currency choices of British exporters, and then goes on to investigate heterogeneity
arising from differences in market power as well as the degree of product differenti-
ation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and
presents new stylized facts on firm and transaction level invoicing choices. Section 3
outlines a theoretical framework. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy. Section
5 presents our main estimation results. Section 6 discusses the aggregate implications
of our findings. Section 7 concludes.
2 The evolution of invoicing currency use
In this section, we highlight the key features of our data and present three stylized
facts on invoicing currency dynamics. The data used in our analysis, a seven year
panel of transaction-level customs data from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) Overseas Trade in Goods Database, enables us to document a series of
important facts about a firm’s use of different invoicing currencies over time. We
exploit the long panel dimension to identify: (1) the role of export tenure in invoicing
currency diversity; (2) the persistence of invoicing currency choices over time; and
(3) the relationship between export tenure and a firm’s dollar-invoicing share. These
facts complement previous cross-sectional work that has examined within-period fac-
tors associated with invoicing currency usage, but adds important new features about
the evolution of invoicing currency patterns over a firm’s life-cycle.
HMRC has recorded the invoicing currency for extra-EU trade transactions since
January 2010. All importers must report their currency of invoicing for every trans-
action. Exporters whose annual exports exceed a value of £100,000 must report
their invoicing currency for each transaction. For each transaction, the invoicing
currency is recorded alongside an anonymous trader identifier, product and industry
codes, country of origin and destination, and customs variables including values and
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quantities.4 Given data availability, our analysis focuses on export transactions to
extra-EU destinations over 2010-2016.5
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Notes: Each point represents the share of firm-year dyads using 2 or more currencies in a firm’s
tth year of exporting, given the the firm has t years of export experience over 2010-2016. The
underlying data are reported in appendix table C1, panel (a). Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade
in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions, 2010-2016.
Our first stylized fact is that experience in exporting is associated with the use of
more currencies by UK firms. In figure 1, we present statistics that document that
firms with more years of exporting experience tend to invoice their extra-EU exports
in a larger number of currencies. For each firm, we calculate the joint distribution
of years in which it is observed exporting and the number of currencies it uses in
the tth year of exporting. Figure 1 presents the share of firms with t years of export
experience that use two or more currencies in the tth year of exporting. The steady
increase from 17.6% for firms with only one year of recorded exports over 2010-2016
4Products are defined by an 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN) code.
5Approximately fifty-three percent of UK goods exports were sent to extra-EU destinations
over 2010-2016 (Calculated by the authors from HMRC Overseas Trade Statistics available at:
https://www.uktradeinfo.com/trade-data/overseas/). When the currency of invoicing is not
reported, we drop the corresponding observation. For instance, in 2015, the share of extra-EU
exports from the UK which did not report the invoicing currency accounts for around 7.5% of
export value and 31.0% of transactions. For extra-EU imports, observations for which no invoicing
currency is reported account for a small fraction of transactions (less than 5%) and a trivial share
of import value (0.1% or lower).
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to 57.4% for firms that exported in every year of the sample period indicates an
important change over the lifespan of a firm. The statistics hint at the possibility
that success in identifying valuable export markets increases the likelihood of success
with using more currencies or, alternatively, that firms that know how to hedge
risk via the use of multiple currencies are better able to survive as exporters. Our
econometric analysis will tease out the factors behind this intriguing correlation.
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Notes: Each point represents the share of firm-year dyads invoicing more than one-half of extra-
EU export value in dollars in a firm’s tth year of exporting given the firm has t years of export
experience over 2010-2016. The underlying data are reported in appendix table C2, panel (a). Data
source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions, 2010-2016.
The second stylized fact, depicted in figure 2, is that firms with more years of
exporting experience tend to have a higher reliance on a specific currency - the US
dollar - in invoicing their exports. For each firm, we plot the joint distribution of
years in which it is observed exporting and the fraction of firms that invoice over
50% of their extra-EU exports in US dollars. Only 12.3% of firms with one year of
export experience use dollars to invoice more than one-half of their exports. But the
share of ‘heavy dollar users’ rises with exporting experience such that 18.5% of firms
which report 7 years of dollar use over 2010-2016 invoice more than one-half of their
extra-EU exports in dollars. The fact that the share of firms which predominantly
invoice in US dollars increases with exporting experience suggests the presence of
firm-level economies of scale in the use of a currency which increase with a firm’s
7
duration of experience with the dollar.
Figure 3: Share of firms invoicing over 50% of extra-EU exports in dollars in year t











0 1 2 3 4 5 6

















Notes: Each point represents the share of firm-year dyads invoicing more than one-half of extra-EU
export value in dollars in year t given k years of dollar invoicing at t− 1. The underlying data can
be obtained from appendix table C3, by dividing statistics in the sixth column of panel (a) by those
in the seventh. Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export
transactions, 2010-2016.
Our final stylized fact relates the duration of dollar invoicing experience to a firm’s
dollar invoicing share. Figure 3 depicts a firm’s prior years of dollar experience as of
t− 1 on the x-axis against the corresponding share of firm-year dyads which invoice
over 50% of export value in dollars in year t. A substantial 42.8% of firms with
6 years of prior dollar-invoicing experience invoice over one-half of their exports in
dollars. This is in stark contrast to the mere 13.3% of firms which predominantly
use dollars even though they had no prior experience with dollar invoicing during
our sample period.
To summarize, an exploration of the panel dimension of UK export transactions
has revealed that firms with more years of export experience use a larger variety of
invoicing currencies. Second, the share of firms that invoice more than half of their
extra-EU exports in dollars increases in the firm’s tenure as an exporter. Finally, the
share of firms invoicing more than half of their extra-EU sales in dollars is increasing
in the duration of a firm’s previous experience with invoicing in dollars. Altogether,
these facts paint a picture of how the use of a dominant currency grows with firm
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tenure in exporting, and more specifically, with tenure in dollar invoicing.
3 A model of currency choice
In this section, we propose a unified framework that incorporates the key elements of
invoicing currency choices from the existing literature and captures the dynamic fea-
tures of invoicing currency choices observed among the British firms in our data. The
environment for currency choice is characterized by nominal rigidities in the spirit
of previous contributions from Engel (2006), Goldberg and Tille (2008), Gopinath,
Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010) and Mukhin (2017). Our novel contribution is the in-
troduction of a managerial cost associated with the use of any currency other than
the firm’s own producer’s currency for invoicing exports.
We consider a firm that faces one-period ahead exchange rate uncertainty and
enters a new export market. The firm’s problem is to choose an output price and an
invoicing currency to optimize its expected profits before it learns the realization of
the exchange rate.
3.1 Optimal flexible price
We begin with firm’s optimal pricing under flexible prices. On the production side,











where Yf denotes output, Af is the exogenously given firm productivity, Lf is labour
and Mfj is imports of intermediates in currency j. Constant returns to scale imply∑J
j=1 αfj = 1. J denotes the set of currencies in which intermediate inputs are
invoiced.
The firm faces a market structure featuring oligopolistic competition à la Atkeson
and Burstein (2008) and Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2019). Specifically, each firm
f produces a differentiated good in sector s and exports it to destination market d.
Consumers in each destination have a nested CES demand over the varieties of goods.
The elasticity of substitution within and across sectors are ρ and η, respectively, with







where Dd is the exogenous demand shifter, Pfd is firm f ’s price in local (i.e., destina-






1−ρ is the aggregate price index in the destination.








where MCf denotes marginal cost derived from the firm’s cost minimization problem
and ξd is the level of the nominal exchange rate in units of producer currency relative




depends on the market share of individual firms (Sfd). Assuming that exchange
rate movements are the only source of uncertainty, we can obtain the first-order























is the log of competitors’ prices in local currency
and Γfd ≡ Γ(Sfd; ρ, η) denotes the markup elasticity with respect to prices. ψjf (=
αfjφf ) is the share of imported inputs invoiced in each currency j which enters
into firm f ’s production costs. ed and ej are the log exchange rates in units of
producer currency relative to one unit of destination currency d and origin currency
j, respectively. C is a collection of non-stochastic terms.
3.2 Currency choice under nominal rigidities
For the currency choice problem, let Πfd(p) denote profit denominated in producer’s
currency of firm f exporting to country d in which p is the log price in local currency.
For each destination, the firm has a discrete choice over four invoicing currencies
including producer currency, local currency, and two vehicle currencies - US dollars




If prices were fully flexible, then exchange rate uncertainty does not matter because
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firms adjust their prices to the optimal level (pfd) immediately for any movement of
the exchange rate. However, because prices are chosen before the realization of any
exchange rate shock, the firm’s optimization problem is to first choose a pre-set price
for each of the possible invoicing currencies, p̄cfd, and then to choose the invoicing













where ecd is the log of the exchange rate in units of invoicing currency c relative to
one unit of the destination currency d. We follow the invoicing literature and assume
that the firm targets its expected profit up to a second-order approximation around
its optimal flexible price in its currency choice. Further to that, we introduce an




fd − ecd) ≈ Πfd(pfd) +
∂2Πfd
∂p2
|p=pfd(p̄cfd − ecd − pfd)2 − F cf (6)
Under a set of simplifying conditions detailed in appendix A and using the equa-
tions (4), (5) and (6), it can be shown that the expected profit of firm f exporting
to destination d from using currency v relative to that from any arbitrary currency










(ψvf − ψbf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Operational hedging
]
− (F vf − F bf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Managerial cost
(7)
where E[Πcfd] is the firm’s expected profit when currency c is chosen. ζcfd denotes the
competitors’ invoicing share for each currency c (= v, b) in destination d. λ′′fd > 0 is a
non-stochastic term detailed in appendix A. The firm will choose currency v relative
to currency b if the difference in expected profits is positive.
To see the underlying mechanisms, the first element in the square brackets of
equation (7) relates to variable markups. With fully flexible prices, firms respond
to exchange rate fluctuations by adjusting their markups. Under nominal rigidities,
6We assume that there is no managerial cost of using one’s own producer currency for invoicing.
We also implicitly assume that the managerial cost of an invoicing currency is not so large as to
affect a firm’s entry decision for each destination.
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however, they choose the invoicing currency that is predominantly used by competi-
tors in order to keep their relative prices, and thereby their market shares, stable in
the presence of exchange rate shocks. This is an exact counterpart of the strategic
complementarity that arises in firms’ optimal pricing behaviours as in Amiti, It-
skhoki and Konings (2019). Note that the strength of the strategic complementarity
in invoicing is governed by the markup elasticity (Γfd) which renders two sources
of heterogeneity to this strategic motive. First is the firm’s market share (Sfd).
Since the markup elasticity (Γfd) has a hump-shaped relationship with the firm’s
market share (Sfd) for given parameters ρ and η, so does the extent of the strate-
gic complementarity. However, for realistic market shares (i.e., market shares below
80%), the markup elasticity increases with the market share. The other parameter
governing the strength of the strategic complementarity is the elasticity of substitu-
tion within a sector (ρ). If a product is less differentiated and thus demand is more
price-elastic, changes in relative prices due to exchange rate movements induce larger
profit changes. That in turn implies that firms exporting less differentiated goods
would have a stronger incentive to stabilize their relative prices against exchange
rate shocks.
The second element in square brackets of equation (7) captures a firm’s oper-
ational hedging motive. All else equal, firms would prefer to match their export
currency with that of their imported inputs since this would provide an ‘effective
hedge’ on exchange rate risk from importing inputs.
The third factor determining the choice of an invoicing currency is the manage-
rial cost of using a particular currency; a higher managerial cost is associated with a
lower probability of choosing the currency. The managerial cost would capture vari-
ous costs of managing exchange rate risk and writing contracts for delivery in foreign
currencies and could include hiring staff or services of a currency management firm.7
To summarize, we propose three testable predictions. A firm will be more likely
to invoice in dollars:
[1] if more competitors use dollars in a destination (‘strategic complementar-
ity’); this effect is stronger for firms with larger market shares and for less
7Several articles suggest the relevance of a managerial cost associated with invoicing in a foreign
currency (Goldberg and Tille (2008), Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010), Gopinath (2015) Also
see Lyonnet, Martin and Mejean (2019) for recent empirical evidence and a theoretical model for
invoicing currency choices with financial hedging.
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differentiated products;
[2] if a larger share of a firm’s imported inputs are invoiced in dollars (‘opera-
tional hedging’); and
[3] if the managerial cost of using dollars is lower relative to the alternative
currencies.
3.3 Dynamic incentives arising from the managerial costs of
a currency
In this section, we elaborate on the managerial cost and present a simple model to
capture the relationship between the probability of dollar invoicing in a new market
and the firm’s previous experience with using dollars.8 One thing to note is that if
the managerial cost were specific to use of a currency rather than to use of a currency
in a destination, firms would sometimes be better off adopting a common currency
for multiple destinations (Goldberg and Tille (2008) and Gopinath (2015)).
Consider a collection of firms which commence exporting and subsequently add
one foreign market in each period. A firm must pay a managerial cost for using a
currency that is different from its home currency. Assume the cost is a decreasing
function of the firm’s invoicing share in this currency in the previous period:
F (ωcft−1) = κ1 − κ2 · ωcft−1 (8)
where ωcft−1 is the share of exports invoiced in currency c in the previous period; κ1
such that 0 < κ1 < 1 represents the cost of starting to use dollars; and κ2 such that
0 < κ2 < κ1 represents the degree of cost reduction due to prior dollar invoicing
usage. This cost reduction could be due to effective cost sharing across consecu-
tive periods or accumulated know-how of conducting a foreign currency transaction
and/or managing foreign exchange risk.
Each market is endowed with a particular set of characteristics and the distribu-
tions of expected profit differences for the US dollar (USD) versus producer currency
8While we model the invoicing currency dynamics through the managerial cost, our proposed
dynamic channel is more generic and would work for any positive feedback mechanisms that satisfy
the properties we described in this subsection. We characterize the general relationship between
dollar invoicing choices in a new destination and the number of prior years of dollar invoicing in
Appendix A.4.
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(PCI) and local (LCI) versus producer currency (PCI) are, respectively, given by:
E(πUSDfdt )− E(πPCIfdt ) ∼ Uniform(0, 1); E(πLCIfdt )− E(πPCIfdt ) ∼ Uniform(0, 1) (9)
Expression (9) can be viewed as a simplified version of (7) where strategic comple-
mentarity and operational hedging factors are realized randomly through a uniform
distribution.9 If there were no managerial cost associated with using a currency
(F vf = F
b
f = 0), then the ex ante probability of choosing US dollars in a new desti-
nation would be simply one-half.
After accounting for the managerial cost, the probability of dollar invoicing in a
new market is the probability that the realized dollar benefit (E(πUSDfdt )− E(πPCIfdt )−
F (ωUSDft−1)) is larger than the realized local currency benefit (E(πLCIfdt ) − E(πPCIfdt ) −
F (ωLCIft−1)) and the realized dollar benefit is larger than 0, which is given by
T (ωUSDft−1) = 1/2(1 + κ2ω
USD
ft−1)
2 − 1/2(κ1)2 (10)
A key prediction that arises from (10) is that the probability of dollar invoicing
in a new market T (ωUSDft−1) only increases in a firm’s prior dollar experience if there
is a positive feedback from using dollars, i.e., κ2 > 0. An immediate implication
of this prediction is that there will be no invoicing dynamics without additional
cost reduction incentives. This means, while it is generally true that firms which
use a high share of dollar-invoiced inputs are more likely to use dollars in a new
export destination, the increased probability of dollar invoicing involves a level shift
in response to the dollar-invoiced imported input share. It does not imply any
systematic change with the firm’s prior experience with dollar-invoicing of exports.
It is worth noting that the positive feedback from dollar usage (κ2 > 0) does not
necessarily lead to an ever-increasing dollar invoicing share at the aggregate level.
Rather, in most cases, the aggregate dollar invoicing share will be sustained at a
particular level. In this simple model, the steady state dollar invoicing share is given
by
9We have assumed a 0-1 uniform distribution for simplicity and convenience. Our discussions






(κ1κ2)2 − 2κ2 + 1
(κ2)2
(11)
which decreases in the initial dollar invoicing cost κ1 and increases in the degree of
cost reduction κ2.
We now characterize the key relationship that determines a firm’s dollar invoic-
ing dynamics – the relationship between the probability of dollar invoicing in a new
market and a firm’s prior dollar experience. Unfortunately, there is no closed-form
solution for the relationship; we therefore assess the key model predictions through
Monte Carlo simulations.10 In particular, we simulate 200,000 firms with 10 desti-
nations over 10 time periods according to the data generating process specified in
(9).11 Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the key theoretical predictions.12
As illustrated in equation (10) and figures 4 and 5, the model gives two quanti-
tative predictions on the dynamics of invoicing choices:13
[3-1] the dollar invoicing probability in a new market is increasing in the num-
ber of dollar invoicing years if there exists a positive feedback effect of dollar
usage on managerial cost (i.e., κ2 > 0) [See figure 4];
[3-2] the effect of one additional year of dollar experience decreases in the
number of exporting years [See figure 5].
4 Empirical strategy
To test the predictions laid out in the previous section, we exploit the invoicing
currency information of UK exports to extra-EU countries over 2010-2016 and es-
timate the probability of invoicing in dollars at the firm-product-destination-year
level. Throughout our analysis, we report estimates of linear probability models.
10In appendix A1, we derive the analytical relationship between the prior years of dollar invoicing
and the probability of dollar invoicing in a new market by adding one additional assumption that
existing destinations stick to the same invoicing currency that was chosen when the firm first entered
the market.
11We drop the first 3 years of the simulated data to emulate the fact that we do not observe the
full dynamics of firms in our empirical data. This is due to the fact that the invoicing information is
only observed for the period after 2010. We do not observe the full dynamics of invoicing currency
choices if a firm started exporting before 2010.
12While simple, the model matches the empirical estimates in subsection 5.2 very well.
13We formally characterize the analytical relationship of invoicing currency dynamics and discuss
the intuition behind the second dynamic prediction (3.2) in Appendix A.4.
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Figure 4: Invoicing dynamics with cost reduction due to prior dollar usage

































Notes: This figure presents simulated data from our model to show how the relationship
between the dollar invoicing probability in a new market and the prior years of dollar experience
at a firm (“Dollar Spell Length”) depends on the calibration of κ2, the degree of cost reduction
due to prior dollar usage. We calibrate κ1 = 0.6. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence
interval of the estimates.
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Figure 5: Invoicing and exporting dynamics





































Notes: This figure presents simulated data from our model to show how the relationship
between the dollar invoicing probability in a new market and the prior years of dollar experience
(“Dollar Spell Length”) at a firm depends a firm’s years of exporting experience. We calibrate
κ1 = 0.6 and κ2 = 0.18. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval of the estimates.
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4.1 Strategic complementarities and operational hedging
We start by testing the importance of the two static determinants of invoicing cur-
rency: strategic complementarities and operational hedging. Specifically, we esti-
mate;










where the subscripts f , h, i, d and t denote a firm, an 8-digit CN product, a more
aggregated 6-digit industry (to which the product h belongs), a destination market,
and a transaction year, respectively. Subscript (−f) indicates all other UK firms
excluding firm f . USDfhdt is an indicator that equals one if the invoicing currency
is US dollars and zero otherwise. The explanatory variable related to strategic com-
plementarity is ζUSD(−f)idt, defined as the dollar invoicing share of firm f ’s competitors











where Exportcfidt is firm f ’s export value invoiced in currency c (measured in sterling)
in 6-digit industry i to country d in year t. The operational hedging motive is
captured by ψcft which is the share of currency c ∈ {USD,Euro,LCI} in firm f ’s






where Importcft is firm f ’s total import value invoiced in currency c (measured in
sterling) in year t. In addition to these main variables of interest, we control for
firm size (TOTEXPft) with the logarithm of the total export value of firm f at time
t across all destinations. This is based on the argument that, irrespective of the
factors above, large exporters would be more likely to use a foreign currency as they
are better able to handle exchange rate risk (Lyonnet, Martin and Mejean, 2019).
14Note that the term ψcft in the model indicates the imported inputs in each currency as a share
of total production costs. But the variable ψcft in our empirical analysis does not exactly match
the theory as it is measured as a share of total imported inputs because firm-level data on the
total wage bill and total materials costs is not available in our dataset. This variable captures the
(relative) importance of a certain currency in a firm’s importing of inputs.
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We also include 8-digit product-year fixed effects and destination-year fixed effects to
control for any time-invariant product and country characteristics as well as product-
and country-specific demand changes that could separately affect a firm’s currency
choice.
4.2 The endogeneity of competitors’ currency choices
One concern regarding the baseline specification is the potential endogeneity of the
UK competitors’ dollar invoicing share (ζUSD(−f)idt). If strategic complementarity indeed
exists, firm f ’s decision to invoice in dollars likely affects other UK firms’ currency
choices. To address this issue, we construct two instruments to isolate the variation
in the competitors’ currency choices that are due to the competitors’ own existing
characteristics and are unlikely to be affected by the current invoicing choices of firm
f . In particular, we exploit differences in competitors’ cost structures and construct
measures of the UK competitors’ dollar import share (ψUSD(−f)idt).
15 We also include
the UK competitors’ average firm size (TOTEXP(−f)idt) as an additional instrument.













where Sfidt denotes firm f ’s export share in a 6-digit industry i to destination d in





4.3 Dynamics: Dollar invoicing in new destinations
Lastly, we examine whether the managerial cost of using a particular currency de-
pends on a firm’s past experience of using that currency. We introduce two firm-level
15This IV strategy is conceptually similar to the work of Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2019) on
Belgian firms’ domestic pricing that exploits the competitor’s marginal cost as an instrument for
the competitor’s price.
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measures to investigate how previous invoicing behaviour in existing markets impacts
the invoicing choices in a new destination, i.e., (1) the total number of years that a
firm has invoiced any export sales in dollars before it enters a new destination and
(2) the dollar invoicing share in the firm’s total exports in the year before entering a
new destination. To distinguish the dynamic impact of the previous dollar invoicing
experience from simple inertia caused by, for example, long-term contracts, we focus
our analysis on a firm’s exports to a new destination. We control for potential con-
founding factors such as competitors’ dollar invoicing share, the currency of imports,
and firm size, as in the baseline case. The new entry specification is then given by:
















ft−1 + γTOTEXPft + FEs + νfhdt (13)
where SpellUSD,lft−1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm used dollars for l years
prior to entering the new market (and zero otherwise) and ωUSDft−1 is the dollar export
share of firm f in the year before entering the new market.
5 Estimation Results
Our analysis documents that strategic complementarity and operational hedging
are important factors driving the choices of invoicing currencies for exports among
British firms. We also document our novel findings on the important role that a
firm’s previous dollar invoicing has on its currency choice in a new destination.16
5.1 Strategic complementarities and operational hedging
Table 1 reports the benchmark results for the dollar invoicing probability of UK ex-
porters. Columns 1 to 3 are based on simple OLS regressions. Column 1 includes the
dollar invoicing share of a firm’s British competitors as an explanatory variable with
no fixed effects, while column 2 adds firm-product-year and destination-year fixed
effects. Both regressions show a significant positive effect of the UK competitors’
16Summary statistics of variables used in our estimation sample are reported in appendix table
B1.
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Table 1: Dollar invoicing probability: Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV (WLS)
UK competitors’ dollar invoicing share 0.319*** 0.041*** 0.026*** 0.076*** 0.423***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.095)
Dollar import share 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.214***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
Euro import share -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.089***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.019)
Destination currency import share -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.115***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.026)
Firm size 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Observations 4,719,628 3,052,546 4,719,628 4,719,628 4,719,628
Adjusted R2 0.0468 0.288 0.149 - -
Firm-Product-Year FE X
Country-Year FE X X X X
Product-Year FE X X X
Hansen J-stat [p-value] - - - 0.156 [0.693] 0.897 [0.344]
Weak IV F-stat - - - 69,591 145
Notes: The dependent variable is the dollar invoicing probability at the firm-product-destination-year level. Columns
1-3 present OLS results while columns 4-5 show the results using 2SLS. In column 5, observations are weighted by
the trade values at the firm-product-destination-year level. Weak IV F-statistic denotes Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
F-statistic. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data source:
HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions, 2010-2016.
dollar invoicing share. These indicate that firms are more likely to invoice in dollars
if more UK competitors use dollars in the destination. Column 3 includes the shares
of each invoicing currency in a firm’s imports to capture the hedging motive and firm
size as well as product-year and destination-year fixed effects. The influence of the
competitors’ currency choices becomes smaller but still remains significant.
A concern with these OLS results is that they do not account for potential en-
dogeneity of the competitors’ dollar invoicing which would bias the estimates. In
the last two columns, we adopt the same specification as in column 3, but imple-
ment 2SLS using the competitors’ average dollar import share and the competitors’
average firm size as instruments for the competitors’ dollar invoicing share for ex-
ports.17 Column 4 confirms the significant influence of the competitors’ dollar in-
voicing. In comparison to the OLS result in column 3, the coefficient becomes larger,
signalling a downward bias when endogeneity is not controlled for. In column 5, we
17The first-stage regression results are reported in table B2 in the appendix. Both instruments
are strongly and positively correlated with the competitors’ dollar invoicing shares. Regarding
the validity of our instruments, a Hansen J-test does not reject the null of over-identification at a
conventional level while the null of a weak instrument is strongly rejected in all IV estimations.
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repeat the IV estimation with individual transaction values as weights and exam-
ine whether firms react differentially to the competitor’s currency choice for larger
transactions. Interestingly, firms are much more responsive to competitor’s dollar
invoicing with the estimated coefficient rising from 0.076 to 0.423. To quantify the
magnitude, a one standard deviation rise in the UK competitors’ dollar invoicing
share leads to an increase in the firm’s own dollar invoicing probability of 2.1 per-
centage points (=0.285*0.076) for the unweighted estimate and by 14.2 percentage
points (=0.336*0.423) for the trade value weighted estimate, respectively. These
magnitudes correspond to 9.45% (0.229→0.250) and 39.4% (0.362→0.504) increases
from their respective mean dollar invoicing probabilities in the sample. To sum up,
these results lend support to the hypothesis that strategic complementarity influ-
ences firms’ currency choices; that is, firms keep their relative prices stable vis-a-vis
their competitors by picking the same invoicing currency as the majority of their
competitors in the market. Furthermore, from the trade value weighted estimates, it
can be inferred that firms are more influenced by their competitors’ currency choices
when their transaction sizes are larger, possibly due to larger potential losses from
the same relative price fluctuations.
Turning to operational hedging, the firm’s import currency composition also plays
a significant role in determining its invoicing currency for exports. In all specifica-
tions, a higher share of imports invoiced in dollars is associated with a higher chance
of invoicing exports in dollars. A one standard deviation rise in a firm’s dollar import
share is associated with an increase in their dollar invoicing probability for exports
of 6.4 percentage points (=0.164*0.391) in the un-weighted estimates (column 4)
and by 7.8 percentage points (=0.214*0.365) in the trade value weighted estimates
(column 5), respectively. On the other hand, a higher share of imported inputs in
alternative currencies - i.e., euros or a destination currency - decreases the dollar
invoicing probability, which is also in line with the prediction.
Finally, we find that firm size - measured by a firm’s total export value - is an
important driver for dollar invoicing in the unweighted IV regression (column 4).
Regarding the fact that the majority of UK firms invoice their exports in sterling
(i.e., the producer’s currency in the UK), this result is consistent with the prior
literature that large firms are more likely to use foreign currencies.
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5.1.1 Heterogeneity in strategic complementarity: market share and
product differentiation
We highlight two sources of heterogeneity in strategic complementarity. First, firms
with larger market shares in a destination have a stronger strategic motive to invoice
in the same currency as their competitors. To see this, we split our sample into
‘large’ and ‘small’ firms at the median of firms’ market shares among UK exporters
within an industry and a foreign destination and implement 2SLS in each sub-sample
(see table 2). Column 1 gives the baseline results previously reported in column 4
of table 1. Columns 2 and 3 report the results from the sub-samples for large and
small firms, respectively. Consistent with the theory, larger firms exhibit a stronger
tendency to align their currency with their competitors relative to smaller firms
(0.100 vs 0.046).18
In table 3, we examine whether the strength of strategic complementarity varies
with the extent of product differentiation. Columns 1 and 2 split our dataset into
sub-samples according to the product classification system of Rauch (1999). Homo-
geneous goods which are ‘traded on an organized exchange’ exhibit stronger strategic
complementarities (0.198) relative to goods that Rauch classifies as ‘differentiated’
(0.075).19 This leads us to employ the new product classification introduced by
Corsetti, Crowley, Han and Song (2018) which is constructed from the use of dif-
ferent types of Chinese measure words in Chinese customs data. Column 3 reports
results for a subsample of less differentiated manufactured goods that are identified
by the use of continuous measures such as kilograms on customs forms. In column 4,
estimates for products that use measure words that indicate that they are discrete
items, such as televisions or motorcycles, are reported. Under this classification,
the analysis shows strategic complementarities are stronger when goods are less dif-
ferentiated. We estimate firms selling less differentiated products (0.091) are more
responsive to competitors’ dollar invoicing than those selling highly differentiated
18One might argue that if we follow the theoretical relationship in equation (7) more strictly,
we should expect the coefficients on imported inputs - particularly dollar-invoiced imports - to be
larger for small market share firms. But as noted in footnote 14, our measure of imported inputs
in each currency does not fully correspond to ψcft in the model since it is measured as a share of
total imported inputs rather than a share of total production costs.
19An alternative interpretation is that goods ‘traded on an organized exchange’ are highly con-
centrated in commodities such as petroleum where the dollar’s prevalence in these goods is not
directly related to product homogeneity. Instead, as Eichengreen, Chiţu and Mehl (2016) argue,
the dollar’s prevalence would be simply due to the fact that the US is among the largest suppliers
of oil-related products and most of the US firms price in dollars.
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Table 2: Dollar invoicing probability: Market share heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Large Small
UK competitors’ dollar invoicing share 0.076*** 0.100*** 0.046***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Dollar import share 0.164*** 0.163*** 0.160***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro import share -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Destination currency import share -0.018*** -0.042*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Firm size 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 4,719,628 2,359,085 2,354,927
Country-Year FE X X X
Product-Year FE X X X
Hansen J-stat [p-value] 0.156 [0.693] 0.003 [0.956] 2.389 [0.122]
Weak IV F-stat 69,591 36,632 39,551
Notes: The dependent variable is the dollar invoicing probability at the firm-product-
destination-year level. All the results are based on 2SLS. Column 1 shows the baseline results
from column 4 of table 1. Columns 2 and 3 are the results using the sub-samples for large and
small firms according to the median of firms’ market share within an industry, destination, and
year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions,
2010-2016.
products (0.043).
5.2 Dynamic evolution in currency choice
In this subsection, we explore whether a firm’s previous dollar invoicing intensity
in existing markets affects its currency choice in a new destination using a sample
of entrants into new destinations. Figure 6 illustrates a key finding: firms which
have more historical experience with dollar-invoicing are more likely to invoice in
dollars in a new destination. As seen in the figure, the probability of invoicing in
dollars in a new destination market in year t increases with the number of years of
dollar-invoicing experience in existing markets as of time t−1, the last period before
entry.
We present estimates from our empirical model of new market entry (13) in table
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Table 3: Dollar invoicing probability by product differentiation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homog. Diff. Low diff. High diff.
(Rauch) (Rauch) (CCHS) (CCHS)
UK competitors’ dollar invoicing share 0.198** 0.075*** 0.091*** 0.043***
(0.092) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Dollar import share 0.102*** 0.164*** 0.150*** 0.182***
(0.011) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro import share -0.015 -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.035) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Destination currency import share 0.081*** -0.019*** -0.011*** -0.029***
(0.030) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm size 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 10,663 4,708,964 2,611,076 1,883,102
Country-Year FE X X X X
Product-Year FE X X X X
Hansen J-stat 0.179 0.154 0.245 0.0368
[p-value] [0.672] [0.695] [0.621] [0.848]
Weak IV F-stat 89 69,553 35,952 29,562
Notes: The dependent variable is the dollar invoicing probability at the firm-product-destination-
year level. All the results are based on 2SLS. Columns 1 and 2 are the results from the sub-samples
for “traded on organized exchange” (‘Homog’) and “differentiated goods” (‘Diff’) based on Rauch
(1999), respectively. Columns 3 to 4 are the results from the sub-samples according to the
differentiation measure of Corsetti, Crowley, Han and Song (2018) in which ‘Low diff.’ denotes
less differentiated goods and ‘High diff.’ denotes highly differentiated goods. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data source: HMRC
Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions, 2010-2016.
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Notes: The figure plots the trajectory of the coefficients of dummies for the
number of previous dollar invoicing years (column 3, table 4). Top and bottom
horizontal bars around each point estimate represent 90% confidence intervals.
Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export
transactions, 2010-2016.
4. With entry into a new destination, we find evidence of strategic complementarities
and operational hedging in the choice of an invoicing currency for exports. Interest-
ingly, one exception is operational hedging in relation to imported inputs invoiced
in the local currency of the export destination (in the fourth row of table 4). That
is, firms entering a new destination are less prone to invoicing in local currency even
when they use that currency for invoicing a share of their imports. In this case,
they are more inclined to choose dollars for their initial transactions in the new
destination.
Turning to the role of historical dollar-invoicing, the sixth row of column 1 indi-
cates that a ten percentage point rise in a firm’s previous dollar invoicing share is
associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in the probability of dollar invoicing
in a new destination. Similarly, the seventh row of column 2 shows that firms with
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one additional year of dollar invoicing experience, prior to entry, are 2.5 percentage
points more likely to choose dollars in their new destinations. Column 3 experiments
with a full set of dummies indicating the specific number of years a firm has used
dollars prior to entry - from one to six years (the excluded category is firms with
no prior experience with dollar-invoicing). We again find a strictly monotonic rela-
tionship between a firm’s previous dollar invoicing experience and its probability of
choosing dollars for invoicing in new markets.
One might be concerned that these results could be driven simply by a positive
association between firms’ dollar invoicing years and their exporting tenure (as in
figure 2). To address this concern, we test an additional layer of heterogeneity, i.e.,
whether the effect of previous dollar invoicing on dollar invoicing in a new destination
depends on a firm’s export tenure. We introduce a full set of interaction terms
between dummies for years of dollar-invoicing and dummies for the years of exporting.
Figure 7 displays the trajectories of dollar-invoicing by exporting-year cohort. A key
finding is that, across all exporting-year cohorts, the probability of dollar-invoicing
in a new destination rises with previous dollar experience. It is worth noting that
the marginal impact of additional experience becomes smaller for older exporters, as
shown in the flatter trajectories for cohorts with longer export tenure.20
What is interesting about the estimates in figures 6 and 7 is that the impact
of previous dollar invoicing experience intensifies with the number of years beyond
the first year. This means that the simple ‘fixed’ component of the cost of using a
new currency alone is not sufficient to generate this empirical pattern. While it is
true that the one-off fixed cost of adopting dollars would imply that the probability
of dollar-invoicing in a new destination is higher for existing dollar users, it cannot
generate the further dynamics of dollar invoicing beyond the first year. That is, once
the fixed cost is paid, any later years of dollar usage should not matter, contradictory
to what is documented in figures 6 and 7.
20Additionally, we break down our sample by firms’ total export size in the last period before
entry and estimate the specification in column 3 from table 4 for each sub-sample. As reported in
appendix table B3, the influence of the number of years of dollar-invoicing on dollar-invoicing in a
new destination is less pronounced for large exporters compared to medium and small exporters.
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Table 4: Dollar invoicing probability at entry year
(1) (2) (3)
UK competitors’ dollar invoicing share 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.071***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Dollar import share 0.093*** 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro import share -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Destination currency import share 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm size 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dollar share in total export (t-1) 0.292***
(0.002)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) 0.025***
(0.000)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 1 0.039***
(0.001)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 2 0.060***
(0.002)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 3 0.082***
(0.002)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 4 0.097***
(0.003)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 5 0.116***
(0.004)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 6 0.140***
(0.005)
Observations 1,181,074 1,181,074 1,181,074
Country-Year FE X X X
Product-Year FE X X X
Hansen J-stat [p-value] 0.0204 [0.886] 0.009 [0.922] 0.008 [0.926]
Weak IV F-stat 15,143 15,143 15,142
Notes: The dependent variable is the dollar invoicing probability at the firm-product-
destination-year level. Observations are of the first-year of exporting in each firm-destination
pair. All results are based on 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s
extra-EU export transactions, 2010-2016.
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Notes: The figure plots the trajectories of the coefficients on dummies for the number of previous
dollar invoicing years by each exporting year cohort. Dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals.
Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions, 2010-
2016.
6 Aggregate implications
To quantify the aggregate importance of the empirical channels driving currency
choices, we conduct a partial equilibrium analysis. In particular, we study the effect
of the positive feedback of prior dollar invoicing in the propagation of shocks and in
sustaining a high dollar invoicing share.
We first investigate how a destination-specific shock propagates and affects the
dollar-invoicing choices in other destinations not hit by the shock. We simulate the
model for 20 years. For the first 10 periods, the model reaches its steady state. We
then introduce a positive permanent shock to the profitability of using dollars in
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destination 1 at year 10.21 Figure 8 shows the path of the aggregate dollar invoicing
share across all destinations over time (left) and that for other destinations not hit
by the shock (right). An immediate effect is an increase in the dollar-invoicing share
in destination 1 as firms switch to dollar invoicing in response to the shock. This,
in turn, increases the firms’ overall dollar-invoicing share and thus the probability
of dollar invoicing when entering other destinations. As a result, figure 8(b) shows
that the dollar invoicing share in all other destinations rises substantially by 2%
[(0.39-0.382)/0.382] in about 5 years time.
We conclude with an investigation of the role of dollar invoicing dynamics in
sustaining a high dollar-invoicing share. Figure 9 shows the evolution of aggregate
dollar-invoicing shares across all destinations. The model without the positive feed-
back from prior dollar use suggests that the dollar invoicing share would be 16%
[(0.382-0.32)/0.382] lower compared to the model with the positive feedback.







































































Notes: These two figures show the evolution of the aggregate dollar invoicing share in the
simulated model of 10,000 firms, 20 destinations and 20 years. The left figure compares the
dollar invoicing share for all destinations (black dots) versus the same statistic in a counterfac-
tual environment where a destination-specific shock to the profitability of dollar invoicing was
given in destination 1 at year 10 (blue squares). The right figure compares the dollar invoicing
share for those other destinations (2-20) not hit by the shock.
21This captures events such as a destination country suddenly pegging its own currency to the
dollar or forming a currency union. This could strengthen the exporters’ incentives to invoice in
dollars through, say, strategic complementarity.
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Figure 9: Importance of cost reduction due to prior dollar use in dollar invoicing
dynamics
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the aggregate dollar invoicing share in two distinct
versions of the simulated model. The black dots represent the aggregate dollar invoicing
shares from the version of the model with a positive feedback from prior dollar invoicing, i.e.,
fUSD(ωUSD) = κ1 − κ2ωUSD, whereas the blue squares represent evolution in the version of
the model without a positive feedback, i.e., fUSD(ωUSD) = κ1 and κ2 = 0.
7 Conclusions
A key feature of today’s global macroeconomic environment is the dominance of the
US dollar in the world’s trade transactions. Since import prices tend to be stable in
the currency of invoicing, the outsized role of the dollar in global trade has impor-
tant implications for firms’ responses to international and country-specific shocks,
shedding light on the transmission of economic shocks internationally. Despite the
importance of dollar dominance, there is little empirical evidence on the underlying
mechanisms driving and sustaining the high dollar-invoicing share in global trade.
Using transaction level data on UK exports to extra-EU destinations, we docu-
ment evidence on two key channels behind the dominance of the dollar. First, we
find strong evidence of strategic complementarity in currency choices: UK exporters
are more likely to use dollars if more UK competitors use dollars in the destination.
This strategic motive is stronger for firms with larger market shares and for those
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selling less differentiated goods. Second, we document a significant role played by
prior experience: firms entering a new destination are more likely to adopt dollars if
they have used dollars more intensively and persistently in their existing markets.
We argue that the strategic complementarity and prior experience channels re-
inforce each other to sustain dollar dominance in international trade. Attentiveness
to strategic complementarity seems to lead UK exporters to choose the US dollar in
those foreign markets such as the US or Canada where the dollar dominates. Once
a firm initiates dollar-invoicing for strategic reasons, a successful experience with
dollar-invoicing in one market can propagate forward in time to the firm’s other
foreign markets, raising the share of dollar-invoicing to widely-dispersed locations.
We extend the standard theoretical framework of invoicing currency choice by
introducing simple dynamics via the managerial cost of adopting an additional cur-
rency. Despite its simplicity, the structure we employ can successfully match the em-
pirically documented firm-level dynamics of dollar invoicing. Counterfactual analysis
of the model suggests the prior experience channel plays an important role in the
propagation of destination-specific shocks and sustaining the high share of the US
dollar in invoicing global trade.
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A Theoretical appendix
This appendix provides a detailed description of our conceptual framework that in-
corporates oligopolistic competition and a firm’s use of multiple imported inputs into
a model of currency choice under nominal rigidities. We further allow for the presence
of a managerial cost that varies with the firm’s prior dollar invoicing experience.
A.1 Production with multiple imported inputs











where Yf denotes output, Af is the exogenously given firm productivity, Lf is labour
and Mfj is imports of intermediates in currency j. Constant returns to scale imply∑J
j=1 αfj = 1. J denotes the set of currencies in which intermediate inputs are
invoiced. The firm’s total production cost is expressed as




where W is the nominal wage and Pmj is the price of foreign intermediate inputs
invoiced in currency j. ξj is the nominal exchange rate expressed in units of producer
currency per one unit of origin currency j. Cost minimization over labour and each















is the price index of
the intermediate input bundle. The share of imported inputs invoiced in currency j
in the firm f ’s production cost, denoted by ψjf , is equal to φfαfj.
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A.2 Optimal flexible price under oligopolistic competition
Firms entering a new destination d face a market structure featuring oligopolistic
competition à la Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings
(2019). Each firm f produces a differentiated good in sector s and exports it to
destination market d. Consumers in each destination have a nested CES (constant
elasticity of substitution) demand over the varieties of goods. The elasticity of sub-
stitution within and across sectors are ρ and η, respectively, with ρ > η ≥ 1. The






where Dd is the exogenous demand shifter, Pfd is the firm f ’s price in local currency






1−ρ is the aggregate price index in the destination. The effective
demand elasticity is a function of the market share of the firm with large firms having




= ρ(1− Sfd) + ηSfd (A5)






is the firm’s destination-specific market share.
If the firm is able to set its price flexibly in response to exchange rate shocks, its











depends on the market share of individual firms (Sfd). The markup elasticity with








(ρ− η)(ρ− 1)Sfd(1− Sfd)
(ρ− (ρ− η)Sfd)(ρ− 1− (ρ− η)Sfd)
(A7)
Assuming that exchange rate movements are the only source of uncertainty, we
can obtain the expression for the log of the optimal price pfd by a first-order approx-














which is (4) in the text.
A.3 Optimal currency choice under nominal rigidities
We turn to a derivation of the optimal invoicing rule. Let Πfd(p) denote profit
denominated in producer’s currency of firm f exporting to country d in which p is
the log price in the destination currency. The firm makes a discrete choice over four
invoicing currencies; producer currency, local currency, and two vehicle currencies
- US dollars and euros. Recall that pfd from (A8) is the optimal price satisfying
∂Πfd
∂p
|p=pfd = 0. If prices were fully flexible, exchange rate uncertainty does not
matter because firms adjust their prices to the optimal level (pfd) immediately for
any movement inthe exchange rate. However, because prices are chosen before the
realization of the exchange rate shock, the firm’s optimization problem is to first
choose a pre-set price for each of the possible invoicing currencies c, p̄cfd, and then to













where ecd is the log of the exchange rate in units of the firm’s invoicing currency
c relative to one unit of the destination currency d. We follow the literature and
assume that the firm targets its expected profit up to a second-order approximation
around its optimal flexible price in its currency choice. Further to that, we introduce
an additive managerial cost that is specific to the currency being used (F cf ). Firm
profit is then approximated as
Πfd(p̄
c
fd − ecd) ≈ Πfd(pfd) +
∂2Πfd
∂p2
|p=pfd(p̄cfd − ecd − pfd)2 − F cf . (A10)
To solve the problem (A9), we adopt the following lemma established in Engel









This lemma indicates that the firm’s optimal preset price p̄cfd is equal to the
expected value of the optimal flexible price in invoicing currency c. An important
implication of this is that the invoicing currency is relevant only if the firm considers
the second-order moment of its expected profits. If the firm maximizes its expected
profit up to the first-order approximation, the choice of invoicing currency is irrel-
evant as all the invoicing currencies yield the same expected value of ex-post price,
E[p̄cfd − ecd], - which is simply the “average” of optimal price E
[
pfd]. Instead, if the
firm targets up to the second-order moment of its expected profit, the invoicing cur-
rency helps to bring the ex post price (p̄cfd − ecd) closer to its actual optimal flexible
price (pfd) - contingent on any exchange rate movements (Mukhin (2017)).














− λfd ∗ Var[pfd + ed − ec]− F cf
}
(A13)
where λfd ≡ −∂
2Πfd
∂p2
|p=p̃fd > 0 and p̃fd is the deterministic steady-state value of
optimal price pfd. c = o, d, v, u corresponds to producer currency invoicing (PCI),
local currency invoicing (LCI) and invoicing in the US dollar as a vehicle currency
(VCI) and invoicing in euros as a vehicle currency (VCI2), respectively.23 The term
Πfd(pfd) in (A10) is dropped as irrelevant to the currency choice. The optimal in-
voicing problem is therefore to choose currency c in which the variance of the optimal
price plus the managerial cost F cf of adopting the currency are jointly minimized.
While simpler than before, the problem (A13) is still complicated. Specifically, as
the firm chooses over multiple currencies, it considers various elements of exchange
rate volatility in each currency (Var(ed), Var(ev), Var(eu)) and the covariances for
each pair of currencies (Cov(edev), Cov(edeu), Cov(eveu)).
24 To limit our atten-
tion to the three key determinants - strategic complementarity, imported inputs and





∂p2 |p=p̃fd < 0 to the zero-order approximation. Second, it
holds that E[(p̄cfd− ecd)− pfd]2 = E[E(pfd + ecd)− (pfd + ecd)]2 = Var[pfd + ecd] = Var[pfd + ed− ec].
23For convenience, we introduce a separate notation o for the choice of sterling, or producer
currency invoicing (PCI). Note that eod = ed and eo = 0.
24Novy (2006) explores how the variances of each currency and covariances would affect the
currency choice in a three-currency environment.
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managerial cost -, we introduce a set of simplifying assumptions:
 Similarly to Goldberg and Tille (2008), the log exchange rate is shaped by
the differential of independent country-specific shocks; ec = ςo − ςc, ec
′
c ≡
ec − ec′ = ςc′ − ςc with a zero mean (E(ςo) = E(ςc) = 0) and an identical
variance (σ2o = σ
2
c = σ
2) where ςo denotes the home country shock. Then,
E(e2c) = 2σ2 and E(ecec′ 6=c) = σ2 for any c and c′.25
 Again following Goldberg and Tille (2008), we express the log price index of





ζcfd(ed − ec) (A14)
where ζcfd denotes the total market share of the competitors which are invoicing




fd = 1. In our partial
equilibrium setting, we assume these competitors’ average invoicing shares as
exogenously given.
 The set of currencies used for imported inputs is identical to that of export
currencies: J = {o, d, v, u}.
Now we can derive the expected profit differences for each pair of currencies.
Plugging the equations (A8) and (A14) into the variance expression (A13) and ap-
plying the above set of simplifying assumptions yields the variance term as:
25We initially assume the exchange rate as ξc = ξ ∗ exp(ec) where ξ is the steady-state exchange
rate and ec is a mean zero innovation. To simplify, let ξ = 1 and thus log ξc = ec.
26This is due to our assumption that exchange rates are the only stochastic elements.
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ψfjE(ejec) + E(e2c) + ..




fd = 1 and the fourth line displays only the terms involv-
ing ec as all other terms will be cancelled out when differencing the variances across
currencies. Then, for each pair of invoicing currencies,




(ζvfd − ζofd) +
2σ2
1 + Γfd
(ψvf − ψof − 1)
]




(ζvfd − ζdfd) +
2σ2
1 + Γfd
(ψvf − ψdf )
]




(ζvfd − ζufd) +
2σ2
1 + Γfd
(ψvf − ψuf )
]
where ∆v,b Varfd ≡ Var[pfd + ed − ev] − Var[pfd + ed − eb]. The expected profit
difference over currency v and b is summarized as









(ψvf − ψbf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Operational hedging
]
− (F vf − F bf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Managerial cost
where λ′′fd ≡ 2σ2λfd. The likelihood of choosing currency v relative to any other
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arbitrary currency b increases with the difference of the expected profits in the last
equation.
A.4 A general framework for invoicing dynamics
In this section, we discuss a general framework of invoicing currency dynamics. We
start by considering a transition function T (.) that maps a firm’s dollar invoicing
share ωUSDft−1 into the probability of dollar invoicing when a new destination is added.
That is, when the dollar invoicing share of firm f takes the value of x, the probability
of choosing dollar invoicing in a new destination d in period t is given by T (x):
T (x) ≡ Pr(USDfdt = 1|ωUSDft−1 = x) (A15)
In principle, the exact functional form of T (x) can depend on the distribution of
a bunch of factors, such as share of dollar invoicing competitors and the dollar share
of imported inputs predicted by a conventional static model. We abstract from the
exact functional form of (A15) for the moment and focus on discussing the general
properties of T (x) and its relationship with the key variable of our interest, the dollar
spell length, SpellUSDft .
Using the transition function (A15), it can be shown that the dollar invoicing
probability in a new destination conditional on a specific dollar spell length depends
on two elements: (1) the distribution of dollar invoicing shares conditional on the
dollar spell length27 and (2) the transition function T (x). More specifically, the
conditional probability of dollar invoicing in a new destination for a firm with dollar
spell length l can be written as:
Pr(USDfdt = 1|SpellUSDft−1 = l) =
∑
x














If the transition function T (.) does not depend on the dollar share, then the
probability of using dollar invoicing in the new destination is independent of the
27For example, given a firm has used dollar invoicing for two years, SpellUSDft−1 = 2, what is the
probability that its dollar invoicing share is x, e.g., x = 0, 0.5, 1, etc.
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dollar spell length, i.e., Pr(USDit = 1|SpellUSDit−1 = l) is a constant for all l.28
To further characterize the dynamics of invoicing currency choices, we specify
on how firms grow by extending their markets and how these firms make invoicing
choices in their existing and new markets. Specifically, to keep the model tractable,
we make the two simplifying assumptions as following:
(1) A firm enters a new market in each period and the size of each market is
normalized to one in all periods
(2) A firm sticks to the currency selected upon entry for each of its existing
markets.29
Figure A1 illustrates the evolution of the dollar spell and dollar invoicing share
for the first 3 periods. In the initial period t = 0, all firms start with zero foreign
markets and therefore a zero dollar invoicing share. In period 1, each firm enters
one foreign market. For a given transition function T (x), the probability of dollar
invoicing in the foreign market is T (0). As shown in figure A1, there is a probability
of T (0) that the firm chooses to invoice in dollars and has a dollar export share of
ωf1 = 1 and 1− T (0) probability of invoicing in other currencies with a dollar trade
share of ωf1 = 0. In period 2, each firm adds one more new destination and the
dollar invoicing share will change according to the existing dollar share ωf1 and the
transition function T (ωf1). As illustrated in the third row of figure A1, there is a
probability [1− T (0)]2 that the firm does not use dollars in any of the two markets
in period 2 and has a dollar spell of zero (i.e., SpellUSDf2 = 0). With probability
[1−T (0)]T (0), the firm uses dollar in the newly added market and has a dollar spell
of one, i.e., SpellUSDf2 = 1. There is a probability T (0)[1 − T (1)] that the firm uses
dollar only in the previously added markets and a probability [T (1)]2 that the firm
uses dollars in both markets. In both cases, the firm has a dollar spell of two, i.e.,
SpellUSDf2 = 2. The distributions of the dollar invoicing choices and the dollar spell
28It is worth stressing that this result does not depend on the dynamic process of firm distri-
butions. An important case in which T (.) does not depend on the dollar share is when the dollar
invoicing probability in a new destination is firm-specific but time invariant, e.g., firms that need
to constantly import lots of dollar invoiced inputs are more likely to invoice their exports in dol-
lars. Therefore, this property rules out this case as a possible explanation for the empirical facts
documented in figures 6 and 7.
29We add this assumption for the sake of analytical convenience. Removing this assumption
will strengthen the mechanism. We discuss the spillover effect of the invoicing choices in the new
destination on existing destinations in the next subsection.
43
in later periods can be obtained by continutously iterating the process outlined in
figure A1.
Figure A1: Illustrating the relationship between dollar spell and dollar invoicing
share
ωf0 = 0
1− T (0) T (0)
ωf1 = 0
1− T (0) T (0)
ωf1 = 1





















Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the dollar spell and the dollar invoicing share of a firm
beginning to export under the following three assumptions: (1) the firm enters one new market in
each period and (2) the firm sticks to the invoicing currency of its initial choice for the existing
markets.
T (x) represents the probability of invoicing in dollar in a new destination given the dollar
invoicing share at the firm level. ωft represents the firm’s dollar invoicing share in period t, where
t = 0, 1, 2, 3. Different colors highlight positions identified with different dollar spell lengths.
Green, red, blue and violet indicate a dollar spell length of zero, one, two and three years,
respectively.
The key challenge, as can be seen in figure A1, is to characterize the relationship
between firms’ dollar spell lengths and the distribution of dollar invoicing shares.
The tricky part is that the dollar invoicing share, the key variable in the transition
function, is only indirectly linked to the dollar spell length. A firm is characterized
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as a dollar user (and therefore the dollar spell length will be increased by 1 year)
if the firm used dollars at least once in any of its export destinations previously.
Therefore, for a given dollar spell, the dollar invoicing share can differ substantially
across firms. Under our assumption 1, the dollar invoicing probability in a new
destination conditional on the spell length SpellUSDft−1 and the exporting age of the
firm aget depends on the distribution of dollar invoicing in the last period (i.e., the
values of ωft−1) and the transition function T (x). With assumption 2, the conditional
probability of dollar invoicing in a new destination can be solved explicitly and is
given by30
Pr(USDfdt = 1|SpellUSDft−1 = 0
⋂
ageft = τ) = T (0) (A17)
Pr(USDfdt = 1|SpellUSDft−1 = 1
⋂






Pr(USDfdt = 1|SpellUSDft−1 = 2
⋂























As can be seen from equations (A17)-(A19), a sufficient condition to get our
empirical results of dollar invoicing dynamics (i.e., figures 6 and 7) is that T (x) is
an increasing function of x.31 An increasing transition function of T (x) ensures a
positive reinforcement loop as it means firms starting with a high dollar invoicing
share are also more likely to use dollars in a new destination. This implies that firms
with a dollar spell length of one year are more likely to use dollars in a new destination
in the next period than those firms with a dollar spell length of zero; hence these
firms are more likely to end up with high dollar shares which in turn increases the
dollar invoicing probability in a new destination in the following period. Notably,
the condition that T (x) is an increasing function of x also naturally generates the
pattern documented in figure 7. As shown in (A18) and (A19), for a given dollar
spell length, the dollar invoicing probability in a new destination decreases in the
30Pr(USDfdt = 1|SpellUSDft−1 = 3
⋂




































+T (1) [1−T (1)]; a3(τ) = T 2 (1).










































31Given T (x) is an increasing in x, it is straightforward to see the dollar invoicing probability in
a new destination is higher for any firm age τ as the dollar spell length increases.
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exporting age of the firm τ .
B Further estimation results
Table B1: Summary statistics of estimation sample
Unweighted Weighted
Obs Mean Std Mean Std
Dollar invoicing probability 4,719,628 0.229 0.420 0.362 0.480
Dollar import share 4,719,628 0.571 0.391 0.603 0.365
Euro import share 4,719,628 0.055 0.158 0.054 0.159
Destination currency import share 4,719,628 0.113 0.287 0.199 0.346
Firm size (log) 4,719,628 14.559 3.231 19.181 2.774
UK competitors’ dollar invoicing share 4,719,628 0.254 0.285 0.359 0.336
UK competitor’s dollar import share 4,719,628 0.578 0.246 0.594 0.272
UK competitors’ firm size (log) 4,719,628 15.748 2.093 18.307 2.529
‘Weighted’ indicates that the variables are weighted by export values at the firm-product-
destination-year level. Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU
export transactions, 2010-2016.
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UK competitors’ dollar import share 0.202*** 0.198***
(0.000) (0.011)
UK competitors’ firm size 0.013*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.002)
Observations 4,719,628 4,719,628
Adjusted R2 0.435 0.612
Country-Year FE X X
Product-Year FE X X
Notes: The first-stage regressions for 2SLS in columns 4 and 5 from
table 1. The dependent variable is UK competitors’ dollar invoicing
share at the firm-industry-destination-year level for which industry is
defined at 6-digit level. In column 2, observations are weighted by
the trade values at the firm-product-destination-year level as in the
second-stage. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data source: HMRC Overseas
Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions, 2010-
2016.
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Table B3: Dollar invoicing probability at entry year: By firm size in year t-1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline 0-5p 5-25p 25-50p 50-75p 75-95p 95-100p
UK competitors’ dollar invoicing share 0.071*** 0.009 0.019 -0.000 0.048** 0.081*** 0.075
(0.007) (0.055) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.054)
Dollar import share 0.103*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.051*** 0.087*** 0.140*** 0.218***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.015)
Euro import share -0.017*** 0.017 -0.006 -0.019*** 0.007 -0.047*** 0.010
(0.002) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.028)
Destination currency import share 0.015*** 0.039** 0.053*** 0.011 -0.018 -0.044* 0.008
(0.002) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.027) (0.134)
Firm size 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 1 0.039*** 0.122*** 0.113*** 0.093*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.082***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.020)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 2 0.060*** 0.103*** 0.166*** 0.134*** 0.114*** 0.099*** 0.099***
(0.002) (0.022) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.023)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 3 0.082*** 0.209*** 0.223*** 0.168*** 0.152*** 0.125*** 0.134***
(0.002) (0.040) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.025)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 4 0.097*** 0.168** 0.237*** 0.199*** 0.181*** 0.167*** 0.120***
(0.003) (0.068) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.030)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 5 0.116*** 0.138 0.328*** 0.244*** 0.193*** 0.188*** 0.095***
(0.004) (0.140) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.031)
Dollar invoicing years (t-1) = 6 0.140*** - 0.387*** 0.251*** 0.256*** 0.212*** 0.134***
(0.005) (-) (0.041) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.035)
Observations 1,181,074 16,232 77,208 97,942 98,036 77,735 17,544
Country-Year FE X X X X X X X
Product-Year FE X X X X X X X
Hansen J-stat 0.008 0.073 6.431 0.004 2.036 0.024 0.429
[P-value] [0.926] [0.787] [0.011] [0.946] [0.154] [0.875] [0.512]
Weak IV F-stat 15,142 225 1,122 1,471 1,545 1,448 298
Notes: The dependent variable is the dollar invoicing probability as the firm-product-destination-year level. Column 1 presents the
baseline results from column 1 in table 4. Columns 2 to 7 show the results for sub-samples based on the firms’ total export values
in the previous year. ‘0-5p’ indicates firms with previous export values less than the bottom five percentile in the sample and so on.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data source:HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods
Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions, 2010-2016.
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C Distributional statistics on invoicing currency
Table C1: Years of Exporting & Number of Invoicing Currencies
Years of Exporting Number of Invoicing Currencies Share using 2+ currencies
1 2-5 6-10 10+ Total given export experience
(a) by Share of Firm-Year Units
1 26.1 5.5 0.1 0.0 31.7 17.6
2 14.6 5.4 0.1 0.0 20.1 27.4
3 9.9 4.8 0.1 0.0 14.9 32.9
4 7.1 4.4 0.1 0.0 11.6 38.8
5 5.1 4.0 0.1 0.0 9.2 44.6
6 3.6 3.5 0.1 0.0 7.2 50.0
7 2.3 3.0 0.1 0.0 5.4 57.4
Total 68.8 30.7 0.4 0.1 100.0
(b) by Share of Trade Values
1 1.8 7.9 2.1 1.6 13.5 86.7
2 1.4 8.2 2.7 1.8 14.2 90.1
3 1.1 8.4 2.4 2.3 14.2 92.3
4 1.0 8.0 3.1 1.7 13.8 92.7
5 0.7 10.2 2.0 2.2 15.1 95.4
6 0.4 9.6 2.8 2.6 15.5 97.4
7 0.5 7.8 2.9 2.6 13.8 96.4
Total 7.0 60.2 17.9 14.9 100.0
(c) by Share of Transactions
1 4.9 9.2 1.0 0.7 15.8 69.0
2 3.7 9.4 1.1 0.7 14.9 75.2
3 3.1 9.4 1.1 0.8 14.4 78.5
4 2.7 9.7 1.2 0.9 14.5 81.4
5 2.2 9.5 1.1 1.1 13.8 84.1
6 1.8 9.4 1.3 1.0 13.5 86.7
7 1.4 9.2 1.3 1.2 13.2 89.4
Total 19.7 65.7 8.1 6.5 100.0
Notes: The raw data have five panel dimensions, namely firm, product, invoicing currency,
origin/destination, and date. We aggregate data and calculate the dollar invoicing share at
the firm-year level. To construct the table, we split the data into different bins as defined
by the row and column categories. For stastistics in panel (a), we count the number of firm-
years that fall into each bin. For stastistics in panels (b) and (c), we calculate the total trade
value (denominated in sterling) and the number of annual transactions of firm-year units that
fall into each bin. Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU
export transactions, 2010-2016.
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Table C2: Years of Exporting & Dollar Invoicing Share
Years of Exporting Dollar Invoicing Share Share with
0 (0, 0.05] (0.05, 0.15] (0.15, 0.5] (0.5, 1] Total dollar-invoicing> 0.5
(a) by Share of Firm-Year Units
1 24.9 0.8 1.4 0.7 3.9 31.7 12.3
2 14.5 0.8 1.4 0.8 2.6 20.1 12.9
3 10.1 0.8 1.3 0.7 2.0 14.9 13.4
4 7.4 0.8 1.2 0.6 1.6 11.6 13.7
5 5.4 0.7 1.1 0.6 1.4 9.2 15.2
6 3.9 0.7 1.0 0.5 1.2 7.2 16.6
7 2.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 1.0 5.4 18.5
Total 68.7 5.2 8.1 4.4 13.6 100.0
(b) by Share of Trade Values
1 1.8 3.2 3.0 1.4 4.1 13.5 30.4
2 1.7 3.6 3.5 0.8 4.6 14.2 32.4
3 1.5 3.0 3.1 1.5 5.0 14.2 35.2
4 1.3 3.0 3.4 1.4 4.7 13.8 34.0
5 1.0 2.8 4.9 1.4 5.0 15.1 33.1
6 0.6 3.4 5.2 1.1 5.1 15.5 32.9
7 0.6 3.2 3.8 1.4 4.8 13.8 34.8
Total 8.5 22.2 26.9 9.0 33.4 100.0
(c) by Share of Transactions
1 5.4 2.4 3.7 1.5 2.8 15.8 17.7
2 4.3 2.4 3.7 1.6 2.9 14.9 19.5
3 3.7 2.3 3.4 1.7 3.3 14.4 22.9
4 3.3 2.5 3.9 1.7 3.1 14.5 21.4
5 2.7 2.5 3.8 1.7 3.2 13.8 23.2
6 2.3 2.5 3.8 1.6 3.3 13.5 24.4
7 1.8 2.3 3.9 1.8 3.3 13.2 25.0
Total 23.5 16.8 26.1 11.7 21.9 100.0
Notes: The raw data have five panel dimensions, namely firm, product, invoicing currency, origin/destination, and
date. We aggregate data and calculate the dollar invoicing share at the firm-year level. To construct the table, we
split the data into different bins as defined by the row and column categories. For stastistics in panel (a), we count
the number of firm-years that fall into each bin. For stastistics in panels (b) and (c), we calculate the total trade
value (denominated in sterling) and the number of annual transactions of firm-year units that fall into each bin.
Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions, 2010-2016.
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Table C3: Prior Years of Dollar Invoicing vs. Dollar Invoicing Share
Prior Years of Dollar Invoicing Share
Dollar Invoicing 0 (0, 0.05] (0.05, 0.15] (0.15, 0.5] (0.5, 1] Total
(a) by Share of Firm-Year Units
0 49.0 3.8 5.8 3.2 9.5 71.3
1 3.8 1.8 2.8 1.6 3.0 13.1
2 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.0 1.9 6.8
3 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.6 1.2 4.1
4 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 2.5
5 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 1.5
6 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.7
Total 54.7 7.9 13.2 7.0 17.2 100.0
(b) by Share of Trade Values
0 8.0 20.5 24.7 8.2 31.6 93.1
1 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.0 3.0
2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.4
3 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.2 1.7
4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4
5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 8.5 22.2 26.9 9.0 33.4 100.0
(c) by Share of Transactions
0 21.7 14.3 22.0 9.5 18.1 85.6
1 1.3 1.2 2.0 1.1 1.7 7.4
2 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.9 3.4
3 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.6 1.8
4 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.0
5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6
6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3
Total 23.5 16.8 26.1 11.7 21.9 100.0
Notes: The raw data have five panel dimensions, namely firm, product, invoicing
currency, origin/destination, and date. Prior years of dollar invoicing indicates the
total number of years that each firm used invoiced in dollars up to t − 1 and dollar
invoicing share is measured at t. We aggregate data and calculate the dollar invoicing
share at the firm-year level. To construct the table, we split the data into different
bins as defined by the row and column categories. For stastistics in panel (a), we count
the number of firm-years that fall into each bin. For stastistics in panels (b) and (c),
we calculate the total trade value (denominated in sterling) and the number of annual
transactions of firm-year units that fall into each bin. Data source: HMRC Overseas
Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export transactions, 2010-2016.
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Table C4: Years of Exporting vs. Number of
Exported Products
Number of Exported Products
Years of Exporting 1 2-5 6-10 10+ Total
(a) by Share of Firm-Year Units
1 18.2 9.7 2.0 1.8 31.7
2 8.2 7.9 2.1 1.8 20.1
3 4.8 6.3 2.0 1.8 14.9
4 3.0 4.9 1.8 1.8 11.6
5 2.0 3.9 1.6 1.7 9.2
6 1.2 3.0 1.4 1.6 7.2
7 0.7 2.0 1.1 1.6 5.4
Total 38.1 37.8 11.9 12.2 100.0
(b) by Share of Trade Values
1 0.8 2.1 1.2 9.4 13.5
2 0.4 1.7 1.3 10.8 14.2
3 0.3 1.4 1.7 10.7 14.2
4 0.4 1.4 1.2 10.8 13.8
5 0.2 1.2 1.4 12.3 15.1
6 0.1 1.0 1.1 13.3 15.5
7 0.1 0.8 1.1 11.8 13.8
Total 2.4 9.6 9.0 79.0 100.0
(c) by Share of Transactions
1 1.6 2.9 2.0 9.2 15.8
2 0.8 2.6 2.2 9.3 14.9
3 0.5 2.2 2.1 9.6 14.4
4 0.3 1.9 2.0 10.2 14.5
5 0.2 1.6 1.8 10.2 13.8
6 0.2 1.4 1.7 10.3 13.5
7 0.1 1.0 1.4 10.6 13.2
Total 3.8 13.7 13.1 69.4 100.0
Notes: The raw data have five panel dimensions, namely firm,
product, invoicing currency, origin/destination, and date. We
aggregate data and calculate the number of products exported
at the firm-year level. To construct the table, we split the
data into different bins as defined by the row and column
categories. For stastistics in panel (a), we count the num-
ber of firm-years that fall into each bin. For stastistics in
panels (b) and (c), we calculate the total trade value (denom-
inated in sterling) and the number of annual transactions of
firm-year units that fall into each bin. Data source: HMRC
Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s extra-EU export
transactions, 2010-2016.
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Table C5: Years of Exporting vs. Number of
Exporting Destinations
Number of Exporting Destinations
Years of Exporting 1 2-5 6-10 10+ Total
(a) by Share of Firm-Year Units
1 21.1 7.9 1.5 1.2 31.7
2 10.1 7.1 1.5 1.3 20.1
3 6.1 5.9 1.5 1.3 14.9
4 3.9 4.8 1.5 1.3 11.6
5 2.6 3.9 1.4 1.3 9.2
6 1.6 3.1 1.3 1.3 7.2
7 0.8 2.2 1.1 1.2 5.4
Total 46.2 35.0 9.8 9.0 100.0
(b) by Share of Trade Values
1 1.0 1.5 1.5 9.5 13.5
2 0.5 1.7 1.2 10.8 14.2
3 0.4 1.5 1.1 11.2 14.2
4 0.2 1.4 1.1 11.1 13.8
5 0.3 1.1 1.3 12.3 15.1
6 0.2 0.9 1.4 13.1 15.5
7 0.2 0.6 1.0 12.0 13.8
Total 2.8 8.7 8.5 80.1 100.0
(c) by Share of Transactions
1 2.5 3.1 2.1 8.1 15.8
2 1.4 3.1 2.2 8.2 14.9
3 0.9 2.7 2.2 8.5 14.4
4 0.7 2.4 2.2 9.3 14.5
5 0.5 2.1 2.0 9.3 13.8
6 0.3 1.7 2.0 9.5 13.5
7 0.2 1.3 1.8 9.8 13.2
Total 6.4 16.5 14.4 62.7 100.0
Notes: The raw data have five panel dimensions, namely firm,
product, invoicing currency, origin/destination, and date. We
aggregate data and calculate the number of destinations at the
firm-year level. To construct the table, we split the data into
different bins as defined by the row and column categories. For
stastistics in panel (a), we count the number of firm-years that fall
into each bin. For stastistics in panels (b) and (c), we calculate
the total trade value (denominated in sterling) and the number
of annual transactions of firm-year units that fall into each bin.
Data source: HMRC Overseas Trade in Goods Statistics, UK’s
extra-EU export transactions, 2010-2016.
53
